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Abstract:  The return of assets that are traded on financial markets are more volatile than
the returns offered by intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies.  This
suggests that individual investors are exposed to more risk in countries which rely heavily
on financial markets.  In the absence of a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities, there
may be a role for institutions that can smooth asset returns over time.  In this paper, we
consider one such mechanism.  We present an example of an overlapping generations
economy in which the incompleteness of financial markets leads to underinvestment in
reserves.  There exist allocations where by building up large reserves it is possible to
smooth asset returns and eliminate non-diversifiable risk.  This allows an ex ante Pareto
improvement.  We then argue that a long-lived intermediary may be able to implement
this type of smoothing.  However, the position of the intermediary is fragile; competition
from financial markets can cause the intertemporal smoothing mechanism to unravel, in
which case the intermediary will do no better than the market.1 Introduction
In the early nineteen-seventies most industrialized countries were adversely
affected by a sharp rise in oil prices. This “oil shock” had a dramatic effect
on the value of US firms. As illustrated in Figure 1, the real value of shares
listed on the New York Stock Exchange fell by almost half compared to
their value at the peak in 1972. This collapse in share prices had a severe
negative impact on the wealth of any investor whose portfolio contained a
significant amount of stocks. Any investor who was forced to liquidate stocks
after market prices fell would have suffered from lower consumption over the
remainder of his life. Retirees in particular might have been affected in this
way.
In Germany, where savings are mostly placed with intermediaries such
as banks and insurance companies and assets are not marked to the market,
the effect was rather different. Since their claims on intermediaries were
fixed in nominal terms, these individuals did not suffer a fall in wealth like
their counterparts in the US and would not have been forced to reduce their
consumption. Somehow the German financial system was able to smooth the
oil-price shock rather than passing it on to investors.
In the nineteen-eighties, the situation was reversed. The economies of
most industrialized countries performed relatively well. In the US, the stock
market boomed, as shown in Figure 1. Investors who held stocks were able to
achieve higher than expected returns and could use these returns to finance
a higher level of consumption. The dissaving generation in Germany did less
well, by comparison. Since their savings were placed with intermediaries,
such as banks, on which they held fixed claims, there was no windfall gain
for them.
The effect of the “oil shock” on the US market is an example of what
is usually considered a non-diversifiable risk. The shock causes highly cor-
related changes in most asset values, so investors cannot avoid the risk by
holding a diversified portfolio. Nonetheless, these episodes illustrate that
the risks borne by individuals in two countries may be very different, even
though the countries are subjected to similar shocks. This raises the inter-
esting question of whether and how different financial systems can cope with
this sort of risk.
Traditional financial theory has little to say about hedging non-diversifiable
risks. It assumes that the set of assets is given and focuses on the efficient
sharing of these risks through exchange. For example, the standard diver-
1sification argument requires individuals to exchange assets so that each in-
dividual holds a relatively small amount of any one risk. Risks will also be
traded so that more risk averse people bear less of the risk than people who
are less risk averse. These strategies do not eliminate macroeconomic shocks
which affect all assets in a similar way. We call this kind of risk sharing
cross-sectional  risk sharing, because it is achieved through exchanges of risk
among individuals at a given point in time.
Departing from the traditional approach, this paper focuses on the in-
tertemporal smoothing of risk. Risks which cannot be diversified at a given
point in time can nevertheless be averaged over time in a way that reduces
their impact on individual welfare. One hedging strategy for non-diversifiable
risks is intergenerational risk sharing, which spreads the risks associated with
a given stock of assets across generations with heterogeneous experiences.
Another strategy involves  asset accumulation in order to reduce fluctuations
in consumption over time. Both of these strategies are examples of the in-
tertemporal smoothing of asset returns.
In standard financial modeIs with fixed asset supplies and a single period,
it is usually argued that somebody must bear the non-diversifiable risk. Such
models implicitly overlook possibilities for intertemporal smoothing. At the
other extreme, in an ideal, Arrow-Debreu world, cross-sectional risk sharing
and intertemporal smoothing are undertaken automatically because markets
are complete and there is complete participation in those markets. Neither
the standard financial models, which assume a fixed set of assets, nor the
idealized Arrow-Debreu model, which does not explicitly deal with institu-
tions, provide much insight into the relationship between the structure of a
country’s financial system and the stock of assets accumulated. In particular,
they don’t tell us how a country’s reliance on financial markets or interme-
diaries affects its ability to smooth asset returns by changing its dynamic
accumulation path.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the consequences of intertemporal
smoothing for welfare and for positive issues such as asset pricing in a model
with incomplete markets. In practice, markets may not be complete in the
Arrow-Debreu sense for a wide variety of reasons, including moral hazard,
adverse selection, transaction costs and incomplete participation. For sim-
plicity we consider an economy with an overlapping generations structure,
which results in incomplete participation. This is a tractable paradigm for
the analysis of intertemporal smoothing and captures many of the features
common to a wide range of models of market incompleteness.
2Our analysis is related to a number of strands of the literature. First,
Scheinkman (1980), McCallum (1987) and others have showed that incorpo-
rating a long-lived asset rules out the possibility of over-accumulation. These
papers are not concerned with risk. In contrast, our paper analyzes how the
risk arising from the dividend stream of long-lived assets is not eliminated
by financial markets but can be eliminated by an intermediary. Secondly,
Qi (1994) extends the Diamond-Dybvig model to an overlapping generations
model. In his model there is no aggregate risk and no role for intertemporal
smoothing. Fulghieri and Rovelli (1994) and Bhattacharya and Padilla (1996)
also compare the performance of markets and intermediaries in achieving an
efficient intertemporal allocation of resources in an overlapping generations
model. There is again no aggregate uncertainty in their models and they do
not consider intertemporal smoothing. Thirdly, Gordon and Varian (1988)
consider how governments can implement policies such as social security to
allow intergenerational risk sharing in the context of a model with a single
asset. They do not consider market allocations and asset pricing or the role
of intermediation, which are the focus of the present paper.
In Section 2 we describe a standard overlapping generations (OLG) model
with two assets, a risky asset in fixed supply and a safe asset that can be
accumulated over time. In Section 3, we show that under certain conditions
the safe asset is never held in the market equilibrium; in fact, it is dominated
by the risky asset, Then we show, in Section 4, that intertemporal smoothing
can lead to a higher level of average expected utility than is possible in the
market equilibrium. Section 5 shows that the market equilibrium is in fact ex
ante Pareto inefficient: there exist allocations with intertemporal smoothing
which make all generations better off ex ante compared to the market equi-
librium. We suggest that intertemporal smoothing could be implemented
by a long-lived intermediary. In Section 6 we show that this mechanism is
fragile and that competition from financial markets can lead to disintermedi-
ationj which causes the smoothing mechanism to unravel. Section 7 contains
concluding remarks. Formal proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 The Model
As a vehicle for the analysis of intertemporal risk smoothing, we use a stan-
dard, infinite-horizon, OLG model. Time is divided into a
of dates t = 1,2, . . . and a new generation is born at each
countable number
date t. Each gen-
3eration consists of an equal number of identical agents, so there is no loss of
generality in treating each generation as if it consists of a single representa-
tive agent. There is an initial old generation which lives for one period; each
subsequent generation lives for two periods.
There is a single good available for consumption in each period and an
agent born at date t has an endowment of e units of the good when young
and nothing when old.
There are two types of assets, a safe asset and a risky asset, which are
held to provide for future consumption. The supply of the risky asset is
normalized to unity, and is initially owned by the old generation. The risky
asset lasts forever and pays a dividend of yt units of the consumption good
at each date t. The only exogenous uncertainty in this economy comes from
the stochastic process yt. We assume that yt is i.i.d. and non-negative, with
a positive and finite expectation and variance.
The safe asset is represented by a storage technology, which converts one
unit of the consumption good at date t into a unit of consumption at date
t + 1. None of the safe asset is owned by the initial old generation so so = O.
Agents choose their investments to maximize their von Neumann Morgen-
stern expected utility. Their risk preferences are represented by the additive
utility function
where  ci is the agent’s consumption in the  i – th period of life. The func-
differentiable, increasing and strictly concave.
The special features of this model are chosen for the sake of simplicity.
In particular, the OLG structure is a metaphor for all the other sources of
market incompleteness that may arise in practice. Extensions are discussed
below.
3 Market Equilibrium
the safe asset held by the young generation at date t. For simplicity, we do
not allow short sales, but nothing is changed in equilibrium if short sales are
allowed, as we explain at the end of the section. The agent’s first-period
budget constraint restricts the sum of his first-period consumption and the
4value of his portfolio to be equal to his first-period endowment:
where  pt is the price of the risky asset at date t. The second-period bud-
get constraint restricts his second-period consumption to be equal to the
portfolio’s liquidation value plus the dividend on the risky asset:
Secondly, the market for the risky asset must clear, that is, xt = 1 for every
date t. In what follows, we focus our attention on Marcov  equilibria, that
is, equilibria with the property that the endogenous variables (pt, st, xt) are
functions of the contemporaneous shock yt. A Markov equilibrium is said to
be stationary if this functional relationship is time-invariant:
Although the safe asset would seem to be a useful hedge against the
uncertain y generated by the risky asset, it turns out that this is not the case.
Since the returns to the risky asset are assumed to be i.i.d., the representative
young agent in a stationary Markov equilibrium solves the same decision
problem at each date, regardless of the state in which he is born, and since
5the old supply the risky asset inelastically, the equilibrium price is constant
and non-stochastic. The net return to holding the risky asset in such an
sometimes positive, the safe asset is clearly dominated and will never be held
in equilibrium.
exists a positive rate of return at which the representative young agent wants
to transfer wealth from the first to the second period of his life. Otherwise,
there is no (constant) asset price at which the young agent is willing to hold
the risky asset and a stationary equilibrium cannot exist.
To illustrate the operation of the market equilibrium, consider the follow-
ing example:
For this case it can be shown that the stationary equilibrium price is pt = 0.5
and the allocation of consumption in equilibrium is
long-run average expected utility is therefore also –0.84.
In this example the risky asset is very attractive. It can be bought in
youth for 0.5 and sold for the same amount in old age; it also pays non-
negative dividends which are 1 half of the time. Since the risky asset is so
attractive, investors sacrifice consumption in youth in order to be able to
consume in old age. They only consume 0.5 in youth but in old age consume
0.5 or 1.5 with equal probability, or 1 on average.
6It has been assumed so far that no short sales are allowed. This assump-
tion can be dropped at no cost, however, since the equilibrium allocations
would be exactly the same if short sales were allowed. The existence of a rep-
resentative agent and the fact that net asset holdings must be non-negative
in equilibrium, together ensure that no short sales can actually take place in
equilibrium, even if they were allowed. Furthermore, market clearing requires
xt = 1, so the short-sale constraint is never binding for the risky asset. The
If it is, then we need to introduce a price qt <1 for claims to the safe asset
in order to clear the market at zero net supply.
The model can also be extended to allow for (random) endowments
sometimes be used in equilibrium. However, it is always true that  st = 0
with positive probability in a stationary Markov equilibrium. Furthermore,
by restricting the distribution of  e1t, we can ensure that the conclusion of
Proposition 1 continues to hold. In any case, financial markets do not elim-
inate the risk created by random fluctuations in endowments and asset re-
turns. Similarly, if the return on the safe asset is positive or it is possible
that yt < 0 the yield on the risky asset will no longer be uniformly higher
than the yield on the safe asset and some of the safe asset may be held in
equilibrium. Again, however, financial markets will not eliminate risk. In
the next section, we shall see that there exist feasible allocations in which
risk is almost entirely eliminated in the long run.
4 Intertemporal Smoothing
In a stationary, Markov equilibrium, the safe asset is not used to hedge
against the uncertainty of the risky asset’s return. However, in an infinite-
horizon economy, almost all of the risk can be eliminated through a program
of accumulating buffer stocks of the risk-free asset. This is simply an applica-
tion of a well known theorem of Schechtman (1976). Schechtman considered
mize the expected value of his long-run average utility:
7process spends at the boundary in the first T periods. The renewal theorem
The same policy works in the present framework. Suppose that a planner
wants to maximize the long-run average of the expected utilities of the differ-
ent generations. To this end, the planner accumulates part of the economy’s
total endowment using the storage technology. Let st denote the accumulated
of the economy at date t. Then by following the policy of setting
we can provide the two generations at each date with a total consumption
ner will divide the consumption between the two generations in a way that
maximizes the typical generation’s utility. If we let
can achieve
Proposition 2 There exists a feasible policy {st} that ensures with proba-
bility one that all but a negligible fraction of generations are able to achieve
8market equilibrium on average. In fact, this must be true for any feasible
allocation in which the long-run average consumption levels of the old and
suppose that
T
is well defined. Then, by concavity,
location, since the agents’ risk preferences are strictly concave in old age
and the variance of yt is strictly positive. This result can be summarized as
follows.
average consumption are well defined,
T
tion.
95 Ex Ante Efficiency and the Genesis of In-
tertemporal Smoothing
In the preceding section, we saw that a long-lived agent, or a planner who
maximized the long-run average of expected utility, might behave very dif-
ferently from the successive generations in the OLG model, who maximized
their own expected utility over a two-period horizon. The former would have
an incentive to accumulate large stocks of the safe asset in order to provide
insurance against rate of return risk, whereas the latter have no incentive to
hold the safe asset at all in a stationary, Markov equilibrium.
This raises the question of whether there is some sort of market failure,
some form of inefficiency, in the equilibrium described in Proposition 1. Be-
fore we can answer this question, we have to be more precise about how
we define the welfare of an individual agent. There are two salient defini-
tions. The first identifies the individual’s welfare with his expected utility
is born. In effect, it treats the “same” individual born at two different infor-
mation sets as two different individuals. The second definition identifies the
implicitly assuming that there is only one individual born at any date, re-
gardless of the information available at that date.
Correspondingly, there are two notions of Pareto efficiency, ex ante and
ex post, depending on whether or not we take into account the state in which
an agent is born. A feasible allocation is ex post efficient if it is impossible
tions without reducing the ex post expected utility of other generations. On
the other hand, a feasible allocation is ex ante efficient  if it is impossible
10without reducing the ex ante expected utility of other generations. We con-
sider efficiency initially using the ex ante notion and then using the ex post
notion.
It is easy to see that a market equilibrium allocation will not be ex ante
efficient in general, because agents are not allowed to trade before they are
born. Hence, all trades are undertaken by an agent after the state in which he
is born has been revealed. In other words, the birth state y
t is a “pre-existing
condition”, against which an agent cannot insure. However, a planner could
provide such insurance by making appropriate transfers between the old and
the young at each date. Thus, even without making use of the storage tech-
nology, the planner could achieve a Pareto improvement from the  ex ante
point of view. However, the expected utility of the typical generation will
be even higher if intergenerational smoothing is carried out, accumulating
reserves of the safe asset and using them to smooth fluctuations in consump-
tion. Intergenerational risk sharing by means of transfers between the old
and young at each date does not remove the aggregate uncertainty caused
by the randomness of the aggregate endowment. Intertemporal smoothing
eliminates this uncertainty, at no cost in terms of long-run average consump-
tion.
Although it is easy to see that intertemporal smoothing can increase long-
run average expected utility, some care must be taken about the way in which
intertemporal smoothing is introduced in order to ensure that each. genera-
tion is better off ex ante compared to the equilibrium allocation. Consider
the policy described in Section 4.
= O, it follows that if the intertem-
poral smoothing scheme were implemented at the first date, either the initial
old generation or the initial young generation or both would be worse off
in an ex ante sense compared to the market allocation. A similar argument
applies in subsequent periods. In order to achieve an ex ante Pareto improve-
ment, intertemporal smoothing has to be introduced in two stages. The first
stage achieves an increase in expected utility by means of intergenerational
risk sharing (transfers) which allows the planner to accumulate some of the
endowment in the form of reserves of the safe asset, without making any gen-
eration worse off. Once reserves are sufficiently large, it is possible to switch
to a policy of intertemporal smoothing and make every generation better off
ex ante than they would be with intergenerational risk sharing alone.
11To see how the first stage is implemented, consider some necessary con-
ditions for ex ante efficiency. If the equilibrium is ex ante efficient, it must
be impossible to make both generations at date t better off by reallocating
consumption at that date. That means that the equilibrium consumption
allocation  (c1t,c2t) must solve the maximization problem
that
and
for every date t. By continuity, the same will be true if we reduce the con-
level of reserves can be built in preparation for switching to the intertemporal
smoothing program.
Let S denote the target level of reserves accumulated in the first stage
and let T denote the end of the first stage, that is, choose T so that sT = S.
To show that a Pareto-improving scheme with intertemporal smoothing can
be implemented, the following lemma is needed.
large that, starting the intertemporal smoothing plan at date  T the
12In the short run, this is obvious because it will take some time to run down
the reserves to O. In the longer run, it is not so obvious that the probability of
running out of reserves is uniformly small at all future dates. The lemma fol-
lows from the fact that reserves follow a “random walk” when st >0 and are
expected to increase when st > 0. This means that reserves are expected to
increase on average without limit under the intertemporal smoothing policy.
Even though the event st = O will occur infinitely often, the probability that
it happens at any fixed date t is becoming vanishingly small as t approaches
infinity.
future generation means that the ex ante expected utility of any generation
their market allocation. There is a problem with the generation born at date
T – 1 since this generation does not get the full benefit of intergenerational
risk sharing but has its second-period consumption reduced on average. To
compensate this generation, we make a one-time transfer out of the reserves.
With this adjustment, every generation is ex ante better off.
Furthermore, since the first stage with intergenerational sharing is finite
in length, the analysis in Section 4 shows that the long-run average expected
result.
Proposition 4 The market equilibrium allocation is ex ante Pareto inef-
ficient. There exists an attainable allocation with inter-temporal smoothing
which provides every generation with higher ex ante expected utility and
achieves the long-run average expected utility U*(u).
The existence of an allocation that improves ex ante welfare for all genera-
tions compared to the market equilibrium can be illustrated in the context of
the numerical example used above. In the initial stage, the market allocation
is altered by intergenerational transfers:
When yt = 0, the old receive a transfer of 0.1125 from the young and when
yt = 1 the young receive a transfer of 0.275 from the old. These transfers
13ensure the expected utility of the initial generation is slightly greater than the
market equilibrium level of – 0.84. They also allow an addition to reserves of
0.028 to be extracted from each generation except the initial one, while still
leaving them slightly better off than the market allocation.
To see how the second stage operates consider the effect on the ex ante
expected utilities of the generations around date T if intertemporal smooth-
ing were implemented at date T and there were no reserves at that date. We
assume that the generation born at date T – 1 simply receives the market
allocation when it is young.
The generation born at date T+ 1 is clearly better off than in the equilibrium,
but generations  T – 1 and T are worse off. If there were positive reserves at
date  T, st >0, the generations born after  T would be even better off. For
the generation born at T – 1, a transfer of 0.21 in their youth at date T – 1
would be sufficient to make them better off than in the market equilibrium.
For the generation born at date  T, a transfer of 0.03 would be sufficient.
Hence the total reserves at the time of the transition must be at least 0.24.
Remembering that the initial generation and generation  T – 1 do not help
build reserves this implies the initial stage must last at least six periods so
T=6.
Comparing the paths of utility in this  ex ante Pareto-superior alloca-
tion with that in the market equilibrium, it can be seen that the first six
generations in this example have slightly higher utility, but all subsequent
generations are significantly better off. The long-run average expected util-
ity is —0.58, compared to –0.84 in the market equilibrium. Note also that
the average expected utility is also significantly greater than can be achieved
with intergenerational transfers alone. The consumption allocation that max-
imizes long-run average expected utility through intergenerational transfers
with no accumulation of reserves is
{
0.5 w. pr. 0.5 c it =
1.0 w. pr. 0.5
14At the start of the section it was pointed that there exist two notions
of efficiency depending on whether we take into account the state in which
an agent is born. Ex ante efficiency, which Proposition 5 focused on, takes
the expectation of utility across all possible states. An alternative view is
that of ex post efficiency where an individual’s welfare is conditional on the
information available when he is born. The discussion of Lemma 1 pro-
vides insights into ex post expected utility in the model when intertemporal
except when reserves are low the ex post expected utility of each generation
large the probability of reserves being low and a generation being worse off
ex post than in the market equilibrium becomes vanishingly small. In fact,
in the long run all but a negligible fraction of generations can be made better
off ex post.
We have so far studied the existence of allocations which allow the intro-
duction of intertemporal smoothing and an ex ante Pareto improvement over
the market allocation, without specifying the institutional framework that
implements them. The existence of such allocations suggests a story of how
intertemporal smoothing by intermediaries might come into existence. Given
the opportunity to make individuals better off, some institution will try to
exploit that opportunity and capture part of the surplus. One possibility is
that a long-lived intermediary is set up to provide insurance against uncertain
returns by averaging high and low returns over time. Such an intermediary
could hold all the assets and offer a deposit contract to each generation.
Initially, the intermediary offers intergenerational insurance. Later on, after
accumulating large reserves, the intermediary can offer almost all generations
a constant return on deposits, independently of the actual returns.
Some degree of market power will be required to ensure that individuals
participate in this scheme, as we shall see in the next section. This market
power may arise naturally or it may be the result of government intervention.
For example, the government may give the intermediary an exclusive license
in order to achieve an ex ante Pareto improvement.
Of course, we do not suggest that intertemporal smoothing would always
occur in this way, merely that the introduction of intertemporal smoothing
is consistent with market incentives.
156 Competition between Intermediaries and
Financial Markets
A commonly heard argument is that financial markets are desirable because
of the risk-sharing opportunities they provide. It is well known that this is
correct as far as cross-sectional risk sharing opportunities are concerned, but
the results of the preceding sections suggest that this argument ignores the
possibilities for intertemporal risk smoothing. We have shown in the context
of a simple OLG model that an intermediated financial system can make
every generation better off than it would be with financial markets alone.
Note that, in this interpretation, financial markets and intermediaries are
not simply veils thrown over a fixed set of assets. They actually determine,
in conjunction with other factors, the set of assets accumulated by the agents
in the economy. By adopting one or another set of institutions, the econ-
omy is placed on a different trajectory, with important implications for risk
smoothing.
A natural question that arises is whether it is possible to combine the
cross-sectional risk sharing advantages of financial markets with the intertem-
poral risk smoothing advantages of an intermediated system. There is a
significant obstacle in the path of trying to combine the two types of sys-
tems. Risk sharing of the kind discussed in the last few sections implies some
form of arbitrage opportunity. Taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities
is rational for the individual, but it undermines the insurance offered by the
intermediary. For this reason, an open financial system may not be able
to provide intertemporal risk smoothing, although it provides a tremendous
variety of financial instruments.
One way to illustrate the effect of competition from financial markets
is to consider the effect of opening up a relatively small, closed, and inter-
mediated financial system to global financial markets. Initially, the small
country’s financial system is monopolized by a cartel of banks that engage
in intertemporal smoothing without the threat of competition. After open-
ing the small country’s financial system, the banks now face the constraint
that individuals can opt out and invest in global markets instead. The as-
sumption that the country is small relative to the rest of the world implies
that prices in the global market are not affected by the financial system of





to participate in the risk sharingbe the optimal allocation implemented in the small country. The global equi-
librium represents a benchmark for the welfare of investors in the absence
of a long-lived intermediary, as well as an outside option for the individu-
als when the intermediary is in operation. We assume that all investors in
the small country make use of the intermediary. Since the intermediary can
always replicate the investment opportunities available through the market,
there is no loss of generality in this assumption.
Disintermediation can take several forms, depending on whether investors
are able to make side trades while taking advantage of the intermediary. We
assume that the intermediary can enforce exclusivity, which means that an
agent who wants to trade in the market is unable to make use of the in-
termediary at all. This assumption makes disintermediation less attractive
and hence produces a weaker constraint on the intermediary’s problem of
designing a risk smoothing scheme. We can show that even this weak con-
straint on the intermediary is sufficient to rule out any welfare improvement
from intertemporal risk smoothing. Alternative (stronger) specifications of
the disintermediation constraint would only strengthen this result.
The disintermediation constraint (DC), which ensures that people do not
abandon the small country’s risk sharing mechanism once they have access
The expression on the right is the maximum expected utility an agent born
at date t could obtain from trading on the open market. The expression on
the left is the expected utility offered by the risk-sharing mechanism. The
crucial point is that both expressions are conditioned on all the information
available at date  t. An agent makes his decision whether to join the risk-
sharing mechanism after he has observed y
t.
The possibility of disintermediation implies that an intermediated finan-
cial system in a small open country does not allow any improvement in ex-
pected utility over that obtained by investors in global financial markets.
To prove this result, we need two additional assumptions.
- The first rules
out the possibility of a welfare-increasing Ponzi scheme: we assume there
17tainable, an agent’s expected utility must be at least this high in equilibrium
and that means his consumption will be bounded below with probability one.
The second assumption is purely technical: we assume that the random asset
return yt assumes a finite number of values. Under these assumptions we can
show that the equilibrium allocation is ex post Pareto-efficient and so there
is no feasible allocation that makes any generation better off without making
some generation worse off ex post. The DC requires each generation to be at
least as well off ex post as it was under the equilibrium allocation and hence
no better off.
disintermediation constraint, then each agent is ex post no better off under
To understand Proposition 5, it is helpful to think about the policy de-
scribed in Proposition 2. That policy provides the two generations at each
actual return and the reserves held by the intermediary, so that the total
amount consumed each period is:
If the reserves held by the intermediary endowment are very low (close to
zero), the expected utility of an agent must be lower than in the market
equilibrium. Compared to the equilibrium allocation, he loses the high re-
So any generation will only be better off if it inherits a
large reserve from the previous generation. This will be true most of the
time, but occasionally a generation will be born when reserves are low and
that generation will be worse off ex post. If that generation can opt out of
the risk-sharing mechanism, the whole scheme will break down, leaving us in
the situation described by Proposition 5.
To see this in the context of the numerical example, suppose reserves
are at zero at date T’*. If intermediation is initiated or continued and
intertemporal smoothing were implemented the allocation of consumption
with markets they would obtain the usual market allocation which gives
–0.84.  Hence when there are no reserves the young
18generation will prefer the competitive market allocation and will defect if
given the opportunity. This is why some monopoly power is important in
establishing and maintaining intermediation as discussed in the previous sec-
tion. Building up the reserves necessary to start intertemporal smoothing
requires intergenerational transfers initially. Access to competitive financial
markets ensures this type of insurance will not be feasible. Any allocation
of consumption offered by an intermediary must match the market and give
)]= -0.84. This means an intermedi-
ary cannot improve on the market.
Proposition 4 implies that ex ante expected utility will be higher for all
generations in an intermediated economy than in an economy with finan-
cial markets only. Incomplete financial markets do not allow intertemporal
smoothing, while intermediaries in principle can, provided investors do not
have ready access to financial markets. This suggests that economies which
are intermediary-based may be worse off by allowing access to financial mar-
kets. As discussed below this result may have important policy implications
for the European Union and other regions considering liberalizing access to
global financial markets.
7 Concluding Remarks
Our formal analysis has focused on a simple, overlapping-generations model.
This benchmark is meant to illustrate the absence of intertemporal smoothing
that can result from incomplete markets and to show how an intermediated
financial system can eliminate the resulting inefficiencies. It is important
to stress that the overlapping-generations structure is chosen because of its
tractability. We believe that there are many other types of incompleteness
that lead to the absence of intertemporal smoothing.
In our model, investors have a short time horizon and this means that they
do not self-insure. Individuals live more than two “periods”, but whether
self-insurance can realistically be achieved in a single individual’s lifetime is
questionable. In the first place, the number of independent shocks may be
small. We can think of the Great Depression as being one shock and the boom
of the 1950’s and 1960’s as another. With this interpretation, the number
of periods each generation lives through is small. In addition, there are life-
cycle considerations which may prevent
example, the desire to purchase a house
19
households from self-insuring. For
and provide an education for theirchildren means that many households do not start saving for retirement until
fairly late in life. For both these reasons, the possibilities for self-insurance
may be limited.
Finally, note that incomplete market participation will not be a problem
when agents have a bequest motive that causes successive generations to act
like a single infinitely-lived individual. There is some evidence that in the
general population bequest motives and risk sharing within extended families
are limited (see Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992; 1996) and the references
cited therein). The issue here is whether the wealthy, who own most of the
capital, have a sufficient bequest motive for intertemporal smoothing not to
be a problem. Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992) point out that wealthy
individuals are underrepresented in the data sets most commonly studied in
this area and we are unaware of any evidence regarding this group specifically.
In the introduction, we used the comparison of Germany and the US
to suggest that different financial systems deal with nondiversifiable risk in
different ways. The model shows that it is theoretically possible for an inter-
mediated financial system to achieve a higher level of welfare than a market-
based system. It is tempting, then, to compare the US and German financial
systems in the light of this example. It is often suggested that German banks
hold high levels of hidden reserves, which they rely on when asset returns
are low. Even if this form of intertemporal smoothing is limited by com-
parison with the theoretical schemes considered above, it may nonetheless
be an improvement over competitive financial markets in terms of reducing
nondiversifiable risk. Thus, the German financial system, with its reliance
on financial intermediaries, may have some advantages over the US, which
relies more on financial markets.
Given this interpretation, Proposition 5 has important policy implica-
tions. It suggests that opening the German financial system to foreign com-
petition, for example by creating a single European market in financial ser-
vices, could threaten intertemporal smoothing and make Germans worse off
in the long run. Of course, risk sharing is not the only consideration in the
choice of optimal financial systems. Other important issues are discussed in
Allen and Gale (1995).
208 Appendix
8.1  Proof of Proposition 1
conditions for the optimality of this portfolio are:
conditions, it is clear that the first condition implies the second. Hence, we
only need to find a solution to the equation
sufficiently small. On the other hand, for p sufficiently large the right hand
a contradiction. Thus, for some intermediate value of p the first-order con-
dition must be satisfied and this value of p is the equilibrium asset price. 
8.2  Proof of Lemma  1
21almost surely. Convergence almost surely implies convergence in measure so,
Suppose that we want to start the intertemporal smoothing plan at date
T when the reserves have grown to  sT = S. We have shown that for any
and T fixed, it is clear that by making S sufficiently large, the probability
that, starting the intertemporal smoothing plan at date T the probability of
8.3
Index




We now prove a slightly stronger result.
inequality, it follows
22Proof.  The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that, contrary to what we
say. By continuity,
8
and the strict concavity
s
which contradicts the other two relations. This completes the proof of the
lemma  n .
which satisfies the disintermediation constraint. Suppose to begin with that
allocation satisfies
The first inequality is the first-order condition, the second holds by assump-
tion and the last two follow from the budget constraints and the fact that
23for each t. Hence, the conditions of the lemma are satisfied.
Suppose that, contrary to what we want to prove, some generation is ex
post better off under the alternative allocation than it would be in equilib-
rium. Without loss of generality, we can assume that generation 1 is better
off. Since the initial generation is no worse off, and there is no possible gain
from using the storage technology, the improvement in generation 1’s welfare
must come from a transfer from generation 2, which implies that in some
2’s second-period consumption can only come from a reduction in generation
in finite time.
Now suppose that there may be changes in the holding of the safe as-
set. Other things being equal, an increase in storage will have the effect of
reducing the first-period consumption and increasing the second-period con-
sumption of a given generation by the same amount, but will not reduce the
The preceding argument will continue to
make some generation better off ex post without make some other genera-
tion(s) worse off. n
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Figure 1
The Variation of Real U.S. Stock Prices 1966-1990